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Abstract. We can classify the (truth-theoretic) paradoxes according to their degrees of paradoxicality. Roughly
speaking, two paradoxes have the same degrees of paradoxicality, if they lead to a contradiction under the same
conditions, and one paradox has a (non-strictly) lower degree of paradoxicality than another, if whenever the former
leads to a contradiction under a condition, the latter does so under the very condition. This paper aims at setting
forth the theoretical framework of the theory of paradoxicality degree, and putting forward some basic open questions
about paradoxes around the notion of paradoxicality degree.
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1. Paradoxes and Degrees of Paradoxicality
We work in the `standard language' for the Liar and the like paradoxes, that is, the language
obtained from the rst-order language of the arithmetic by augmenting a distinguished unary
predicate symbol T . Let L be the rst-order language of the arithmetic, which includes S, +,
 and 0 as its non-logical symbols. Let L + be the language obtained from L by augmenting a
distinguished unary predicate symbol T . Unless otherwise claimed, when we say a formula, we
mean a formula of L +. We will also use L + to denote the set of all sentences, and so by A 2 L +,
we mean A is a sentence of L +. The intended model of the language L is N = hN;0 ;+; ; 0 i, that
is, the structure of natural numbers. Correspondingly, for L +, we will only consider those models
of the form hN; Xi, where X  N is the extension of T . We can routinely dene VN;X(A), i.e., the
truth value of A in the model hN; Xi. Since the ground model N is always xed, we use VX(A)
instead of VN;X(A). When VX(A) = T(F), we will say A is true (false) for X. Sometimes, we also
use X j=A for VX(A) = T. For brevity, we use A  B to denote that A$ B is true for all X  N.
For a sentence A, we use pAq for the Godel's number of A, and pAq for the corresponding
numeral to the number pAq. But, to avoid too many complications, we will often identify pAq with
pAq, and identify a set  of sentences with the set of the Godel's number of all sentences in . For




, and use V(A) instead of VfpBq j B2g(A). For any
n  0, dene inductively TnpAq as follows: T 0pAq = A and Tn+1pAq = T pTnpAqq for n  0.
Our method of constructing the paradoxes is the standard one via Godel's diagonal lemma. For
instance, by use of Godel diagonalization, we can construct the Liar sentence , which satises the
equivalence   :T pq.
Next we dene the revision sequence, which is a basic notion from the revision theory of truth.
Note that the revision sequence was originally dened for arbitrarily large ordinals by Gupta and
Herzerger. But for the present purpose, we only need to consider the revision sequences of length
!.
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Definition 1.1 ([Gupta(1982)], p. 10; [Herzberger(1982)], p. 68). For a set  of sentences, dene
r = fA 2 L + j  j=Ag. Dene a sequence 0, . . . , k, . . . as follows: 0 = , and k+1 = rk
for all k  0. This sequence is called the revision sequence starting from .
We will generalize the notion of the revision sequence. To motivate the generalization, we recall
that to say a set of sentences is paradoxical is to say there is no interpretation of T such that
Tarski's scheme T pAq$ A holds for all A in this set. A precise denition is as follows.
Definition 1.2. A set  of sentences is paradoxical, if there is no   satisfying the condition:
  \  =  r \ . That is, there is no   such that for any A 2 , V (T pAq) = V (A).
From now on, we always use K to denote the digraph hW;Ri unless otherwise claimed. An
assignment in K is a mapping from W to the powerset P(L +).
Definition 1.3 ([Hsiung(2009)], pp. 243-244). Let  be a set of sentences. An assignment in K,
say t, is admissible for , if for all u; v 2W satisfying uR v,
t(v) \  = t(u)r \  (1)
 is paradoxical in K, if there is no admissible assignment for  in K.
When  is the set of all sentences, W is the set of natural numbers and R is the successor
relation between natural numbers, an admissible assignment t for  in K is a revision sequence
starting from the set t(0). And so the revision sequence is a special instance of the admissible
assignment. And the notion of being paradoxical in a digraph is also a generalization of being
paradoxical. Actually,  is paradoxical, i it is paradoxical in the minimal reexive digraph. Note
also that (1) is equivalent to
for all A 2 ; Vt(v)(T pAq) = Vt(u)(A):
And so the biconditional (1) is a formal representation of biconditional (2) in L +:
T pAq (holds) at v, i A (holds) at u, (2)
(where u and v are any points in the domain of a digraph such that u bears the binary relation of
the digraph to v.) Hence, when a set of sentences is paradoxical in a digraph, we can think that it
is impossible to evaluate these sentences (without contradiction) in the digraph such that scheme
(2) holds for all of these sentences.
The idea behind the notion of paradoxicality in a digraph is that paradoxes are conditionally
contradictory. As we all know, paradoxical sentences lead to a contradiction, but unlike those
contradictory sentences such as `the snow is white and it is not white', they are not absolutely
contradictory otherwise there is no way to ban them from our cherished theories.
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Definition 1.4 ([Hsiung(2009)], pp. 248, 254). Let ;  be two sets of sentences. Dene P  ,
if for any digraph K, whenever  is paradoxical in K,   is also paradoxical in K. Dene P  , if
P   and  P . Dene <P  , if P   but  6P  .
Note that P is an equivalence relation. When P  , we will say  and   have the same
degree of paradoxicality . When <P  , we say  has a (strictly) lower degree of paradoxicality
than  .
2. Boolean Paradoxes
By the Godel diagonal lemma, we can construct a large number of paradoxes in L +. Here are
some examples:
Example 2.1. (a) (Cliche) the n-cycle liar n = fni j 1  i  ng, where n1  :Tpnnq and
ni+1  T pni q (1  i < n).
(b) ([Herzberger(1982)], pp. 74-75 and [Yablo(1985)], p. 340) the !-cycle liar ! = f! j 1   
!g, if !1  :Tp!!q, !i+1  T p!i q (i  1) and !!  8x (x > 0! T p!_xq).
(c) ([Yablo(1985)], p. 340 and [Yablo(1993)]) Yablo's paradox  = f1; 2; 3; : : :g, where for any
n > 0,
n  8x (x > n! :T p _xq)
Definition 2.2. Let  be a nite set of sentences, say f1; 2; : : : ; mg.
(1)  is a Boolean system, if for all 1  i  m,
i  fi
 
T pj1q; : : : ; T pjniq

;
where fi is a Boolean function which has T pj1q; : : : ; T pjniq as its arguments.
(2) A Boolean paradox is a paradoxical Boolean system.
Remark: Roughly speaking, Boolean paradoxes are those paradoxes in which there is no occur-
rence of quantiers, whose scope covers at least an occurrence of the truth predicate T . For any
positive n, the n-cycle liar is a Boolean paradox, but neither the !-cycle liar nor Yablo's paradox
is Boolean.
Example 2.3. A typical Boolean paradox is Wen's paradox ([Wen(2001)], p. 44)8>><>>:
1  T p2q ^ :T p3q
2  :T p1q _ T p3q
3  T p1q ^ T p2q
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We can give a complete characterization of the Boolean paradoxes with respect to their degrees
of paradoxicality. The key to characterize them is the revision periods.
For the revision sequence X = hXk j k  0i, we also use Xk(A) = T instead of Xk j=A (and
Xk(A) = F instead of Xk 6j=A). When Xk(A) = T, we can say A is true at stage k of X .
Definition 2.4. Let  be a set of sentences.
(1) A number m  1 is a (revision) period of  on a revision sequence X = hXk j k  0i, if there
exists a number N  0 such that Xk+m(A) = Xk(A) for all k  N and for all A 2 . m is a
period of , if m is a period of  on some X .
(2) A period p of  is said to be primary, if m - p (i.e., p is not divisible by m) for any period m
of  with m 6= p.
Example 2.5. (a) the n-cycle paradox has the unique primary period 2i+1, where n = 2i(2j + 1)
(b) Yablo's paradox has the unique primary period 2 (the same as the Liar does)!
(c) the !-cycle paradox (and other transnite cycle paradoxes) has no periods at all.
Remark: all the known paradoxes in the eld of truth theory, without exception, have a unique
primary period if they have at least one.
Proposition 2.6. Every Boolean paradoxes has only nitely many but non-zero primary periods.
The following graph-theoretical notion is also crucial for our characterization of Booleans para-
doxes.
Definition 2.7. Let K = hW;R i be a frame. A sequence  = u0 u1 : : : ul is a walk from u0 to ul,
if either uiRui+1 or ui+1Rui holds for any 0  i < l.  is a closed walk, if u0 = ul.  is a cycle, if
none of the points in  is repeated except that u0 = ul.
Dene a mapping h on the set of walks of K as follows: for any world u 2 W , hK(u) = 0; and
for any walk  = u0 u1 : : : ul ul+1 (l  0),
hK() =
8<: hK(u0 u1 : : : ul) + 1; if ulRul+1;hK(u0 u1 : : : ul)  1; otherwise.
hK() is called the height of  in K. The subscript K will be suppressed if no confusion arises.
Our characterization theorem about Boolean paradoxes is as follows:
Theorem 2.8. ([Hsiung(2017)], p. 885) For any Boolean paradox  and for any digraph K, the
following three conditions are equivalent:
(a)  is non-paradoxical in K.
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(b) For each connected component of K, there exists a primary period of , which divides the height
of any cycle in this component.
(c) For each closed walk in K, its height is a period of .
The following is a converse of Proposition 2.6, by which we can construct as we like.
Theorem 2.9. ([Hsiung(2017)], p. 885) For any nite non-empty set P of numbers greater than
1, if no element of P is a multiple of any other, then there exists a Boolean paradox such that the
set of its primary periods is just P .
Example 2.10. A paradox of primary periods 2 and 3: f1; 2; 3g, such that8>>>>><>>>>>:
1  (T p1q ^ T p2q) _ (T p1q ^ :T p2q ^ T p3q)
2  (T p1q ^ T p3q) _ (:T p2q ^ :T p3q)
_(:T p1q ^ T p2q ^ T p3q)
3  (T p1q ^ :T p3q) _ (:T p1q ^ T p2q ^ :T p3q)
By the above main theorems, we can get a description of the structure of degrees of Boolean
paradoxes.
Theorem 2.11. ([Hsiung(2017)], p. 885) The set of Boolean paradoxes ordered by the binary
relation P is an unbounded dense lattice.
Example 2.12. An example for Denseness:
 The periods of the Liar: f2; 4; 6; : : : ; 2n; : : :g
 The periods of the Joudain's card: f4; 8; 12; : : : ; 4n; : : :g
the Liar <P the Jourdain's card.
Now nd a paradox, namely , such that
the Liar <P  <P the Jourdain's card.
 The periods of : f4; 6; 8; 12; : : : ; 4n; 6n; : : :g
Example 2.13. An example for Greatest Lower Bound:
 The periods of the Liar: f2; 4; 6; : : : ; 2n; : : :g
 The periods of Wen's paradox: f3; 6; 9; : : : ; 3n; : : :g
the Liar jP Wen's paradox.
Find a paradox , such that its degree is the greatest lower bound of degrees of the Liar and
Wen's paradox.
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 The periods of : f2; 3; 4; 6; : : : ; 2n; 3n; : : :g
Example 2.14. An example for Least Upper Bound:
 The periods of the Liar: f2; 4; 6; : : : ; 2n; : : :g
 The periods of Wen's paradox: f3; 6; 9; : : : ; 3n; : : :g
the Liar jP Wen's paradox.
Find a paradox , such that its degree is the least upper bound of degrees of the Liar and
Wen's paradox.
 The periods of : f6; 12; 18; : : : ; 6n; : : :g
Even we only consider Boolean paradoxes, and even they are only a small part of the paradoxes
and have relatively simple syntactical structures, the area of our study is proved to be rich in
mathematical structures and properties.
Now we raise a question about Boolean paradoxes. Wen's paradox (as shown in Example 2.3) is
evidently not directly self-referential. But the paradoxes we construct by the methods of Theorem
2.9 are usually directly self-referential (an typical example is shown in Example 2.10). Our question
is whether we can construct a non-directly-self-referential Boolean paradox for a given nitely many
primary periods.
Problem 2.15. ([Hsiung(2017)], p. 898-899) Is there a Boolean paradox f1; 2; 3g of the
periodicity set f2; 3g which is not directly self-referential in the following sense: for any
1  i  3, there is no occurrence of T piq in the right side of denitional equivalence of
i? For any Boolean paradox, is there a Boolean paradox which has the same primary
periods as the known one, but is not directly self-referential in the similar sense we
just explain for the Boolean paradox of the periodicity set f2; 3g?
3. The Algebraic Structure for Degrees of Paradoxes
Theorem 2.11 provides us a description of the algebraic structure for degrees of Boolean para-
doxes. A natural question is to ask about the algebraic structure for degrees of all paradoxes. For
instance, can Theorem 2.11 be extended to all the paradoxes, no matter they are Boolean or not.
A basic result about the paradoxes is that their degrees are bounded above by the degree of
!-liar or by the degree of McGee's paradox ([McGee(1985)], p. 400).
Theorem 3.1. ([Hsiung(2018)]) The !-liar and McGee's paradox have the highest degree of para-
doxicality.
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Dually, we ask:
Problem 3.2. ([Hsiung(2017)], p. 913) Is there a paradox whose degree is the lowest
(among all the degrees of paradoxes)?
We conjecture that the answer to this question is positive. A reasonable candidate is the paradox
whose primary periods are exactly the prime numbers. And, if it is so, the crucial point of this
question is how to construct such a paradox.
There are some new questions we can ask of course. The rst question we ask is about the
completeness of degrees of paradoxes.
Problem 3.3. Is the structure for degrees of paradoxes complete? In other words, for
countably innite many paradoxes, is there always a paradox whose degree is least
upper bound/greatst lower bound of the degrees of these paradoxes?
Remark: Problem 3.3 is well-dened because of Theorem 3.1 and Problem 3.2.
Problem 3.4. For any paradox, is there any paradox such that the supremum of
their degrees is just the degree of !-liar (i.e., the greatest degree)? Or, For any
paradoxicality, is there any degree of paradoxicality such that their supremum is just
the greatest degree?
Dually, we ask: for any paradox, is there any paradox such that the inmum of
their degrees is just the smallest degree (assume it does exist)?
To sum up, we actually ask whether the degrees of paradoxicality can form a Boolean algebra.
Up to now, we can summarize the above observations and problems by Figure 1. Note, in
Figure 1, the big diamond stands for the degrees of paradoxes, and the small diamond surrounded
by the dashed line stands for the degree of Boolean paradoxes. The degrees of the Liar and its
nitary variants occur in the middle line of the two diamonds, and the degree of Yablo's paradox
occurs at the same level as that of the Liar (Theorem 5.1).
As far as the small diamond is concerned, Theorem 2.11 provides a lot of information. The
future main task is to investigate the whole big diamond.
4. Some Implicitly dened Paradoxes
We can dene semantically some paradoxes inL + without seeing their syntactical specication.
The following are some simplest examples.
Definition 4.1 ([Hsiung(2009)], 248). For any positive number n, we use n for a sentence such
that for any frame K and for any admissible assignment t of K, and for any points u and v of W
such that uRn v,









Figure 1: degrees of paradoxes
Here, note that uRn v denotes that there exist u0, . . . , un such that u0 = u, un = v and for
0  i < n, uiRui+1. n is called `n-jump liar'. Clearly, the 1-jump liar is the liar, which is the
unique one that we have known its syntactical representation among all the jump liars up to now.
Let us say the n-jump liar is implicitly dened.
Problem 4.2 ([Hsiung(2009)], 269). For any number n > 1, is there any sentence of L +,
which is a syntactical specication of n? Or more briey, can we always construct
the n-jump liar?
We can of course provide more implicitly dened paradoxes as we like. Here are some examples.
For convenience, I will use
 
P (u;v)(===) '
to denote the statement that \ () '" holds for all worlds u and v in the domain of a frame
such that the condition P (u; v) is satised.
Definition 4.3. For any positive number n, let i (1  i  n) be sentences such that for any
frame K and for any admissible assignment t of K, we have
t(v) j=1 uRv(==) t(u) 6j=n: (4-1)
t(v) j=2 uR
2v(==) t(u) 6j=1: (4-2)
t(v) j=3 uR
3v(==) t(u) 6j=2: (4-3)
: : : : : :
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t(v) j=n uR
nv(===) t(u) 6j=n 1: (4-n)
Problem 4.4. Find the characterization frames for the set of i (1  i  n). And if
possible, construct these sentences in L +.
5. Yablozation of Paradoxes
One interesting respect of Yablo's paradox is that it gives a method of eliminating self-reference
of a paradox (see for instance [Schlenker(2007)]). More interesting, such a method seems not to
damage the degree of paradoxes which removing the self-reference of a paradox.
Theorem 5.1. ([Hsiung(2013)], p. 26) The Yablo's paradox has the same degree of paradoxicality
as the Liar.
More generally, for any n-cycle liar n, we can dene its Yablozation n as follows: let n =
fij j 1  i  n; j  1g such that
(1) for all j  1, 1j is the sentence which says nk is untrue for all k > j;
(2) for all 1  i < n, j  1, i+1j is the sentence which says ik is true for all k > j.
As is illustrated in the right column of table 1, all of these sentences form an innite matrix. Note























3 : : :







3 : : :
Table 1: The n-cycle liar and its Yablozation
Theorem 5.2. For any positive integer n, the n-cycle liar and its Yablozation have the same degree
of paradoxicality.
Clearly, the above procedure of Yablozation can be extended to any paradox. For instance, for
Yablo's paradox itself, we can Yabloze it one more and get an even big monster paradox.
Problem 5.3. Does a paradox always have the same degree of paradoxicality as its
Yablozation?
There is no reason to resist conjecturing that the answer should be positive.
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